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THE NORTH AMERICAN PAUL TILLICH SOCIETY ANNUAL MEETING

PROGRAM
See Map of Toronto on Back Page

Friday, 22 November 2002

1:00 PM –6:30 PM
Westin Harbour, Queens Quay 1 [AM 16]
(Additional Meeting 16 in the AAR/SBL Program Book)

1:30 PM  A Celebration of New Publications on Paul Tillich

Michael F. Drummy, Longmont, Colorado
Presiding

Dialogues of Paul Tillich, edited by Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald H. Stone

Panelists:

Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville
Ronald H. Stone, Pittsburgh theological Seminary
Jean Richard, Université Laval

Paulus Then and Now: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Theological World and the Continuing Relevance of His Work by John J. Carey

Panelists:

John J. Carey, Agnes Scott College and Rhodes College
Thomas G. Bandy, Easum, Bandy and Associates
Donald F. Dreisbach, Northern Michigan University

3:30 PM  Break

3:45 PM  Tillich and Islamic Theology: Common Themes

Charles T. Mathewes, University of Virginia
Presiding
Basit B. Koshul, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN
The Divine, the Demonic, and the Ninety-nine Names of Allah: Tillich’s Idea of the Holy and the Qur’anic Narrative

Jawad Ashraf, Hartford Seminary
Paul Tillich and the Reconstruction of Sin and Salvation in Islamic Theological Anthropology

Umeyye Yazicioglu, University of Virginia
Reconciling Reason and Faith: A Comparison of Paul Tillich and B. Said Nursi

Kelton Cobb, Hartford Seminary
Revelation and the Disciplines of Reason in the Works of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Paul Tillich

Darlene Fozard Weaver, Villanova University
Response

7:00 PM – 10:00 PM
Annual Banquet [AM 40]
Marcel’s Bistro, 315 King St. West
(See Banquet information and reservation form below)

7:00 Social Hour: Rob James, NAPTS President, Presiding

7:30 Dinner

9:00 Greetings from the DPTG President: Gert Hummel, Bishop of Tbilisi

Greetings from APTF President: Marc Boss, Institute Protestant de Théologie Montpelier University

9:15 Awarding of the 2002 Paul Tillich Prize for the Best Student Paper

9:20 Banquet Address by Peter H. John
The Words I Recorded, The Man I Knew

Annual Business Meeting
Election of new officers
Report of the President and Secretary Treasurer
New Business

Sunday, 24 November 2002

11:45 AM – 12:45 PM
Royal York - Montebello [AM140]

Annual Business Meeting
Election of new officers
Report of the President and Secretary Treasurer
New Business

Monday, 25 November 2002

9:00 AM – 11:30 AM
Royal York Confederation 3 [A192]

The New Program Group
Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture
Tillich in Dialogue

Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville
Presiding

Marc Boss, Institute Protestant de Théologie, Montpelier  
Pragmatism and Beyond: Richard Rorty and Tillich in Dialogue

Peter Slater, University of Toronto  
Bakhtin and Tillich

Jonathan Rothchild, University of Chicago  
Framing, Fragmenting, and Freud(?) : Models of the Self and Faith Formation in Paul Tillich and Iris Murdoch

Britt–Mari Sykes, University of Ottawa  
Critical Psychology and Ultimate Concern: Paul Tillich’s Answer to Faith in the Postmodern World

1:00 PM – 3:33 PM
Nineteenth Century Theology Group and Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture
Sheraton Center–Conference Room G  [A216]

Paul Tillich and Ernst Troeltsch
Garrett Green Connecticut College
Robison B. James, University of Richmond  
Presiding

Jean Richard, Université Laval  
Two Turing Points in Modern Theology: Tillich and Troeltsch

Garrett E. Paul, Gustavus Adolphus College  
Being and History in Tension: Troeltsch and Tillich on History and Dogmatics

Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville  
Troeltsch and Tillich: Christians Seeking Religion Outside the Churches

Paul DeHart, Vanderbilt University
Dawn Devries, Union Theological Seminary and Presbyterian School of Christian Education  
Responses

4:00 PM – 6:30 PM
Sheraton Centre–Conference Room B  [A247]
Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture

Paul Tillich, Postmodernism, and Process Thought
Robison B. James, University of Richmond  
Presiding

John Thatamanil, Millsaps College  
God as Dynamic Ontological Creativity: Exploring the Possibilities for a Tillichian Process Theology

Louis G. Pedraja, Memphis Theological Seminary  
The Lure of Faith: Tillich’s Understanding of Faith and Whitehead’s Understanding of God

Loye Ashton, Boston University  
Rhythmicity and the Relocation of Tillich in Postmodern Theology

Edgar A. Towne, Christian Theological Seminary  
Tillich on the Actuality of God as Apprehended by Faith

Business Meeting of the AAR Group
Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture

Robison B. James, University of Richmond
Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville  
Presiding

ANNUAL TILLICH SOCIETY BANQUET

The annual banquet of the North American Paul Tillich Society will take place on Friday evening, November 22, 2002.

Time:  7:00 PM – 10:00 PM

Place:  Marcel’s Bistro
315 King Street West (near the corner of King and John)
Toronto, Ontario
Phone:  416-591-8600.

There are two restaurants in the building. Marcel’s is upstairs and the Society has reserved the entire room.

Cost:  $45 USD (including tax and tip).

Presiding:  Robison James
President, The North American Paul Tillich Society
Spring 2003

Charles Johnson

*S. Wilson and Grace M. Pollock Professor of English, University of Washington, Seattle*

Thursday, 10 April 2003

5:15 PM

The Memorial Church

Harvard University

Professor Johnson, a recipient of a MacArthur Foundation Award in 1998 and the National Book Award in 1990, will speak on the meeting of Western theology and Eastern philosophy. He has been interested in Tillich since his years in graduate school.

*For more information, please contact:*

William R. Crout, Office of the University Marshall Wadsworth House, Harvard University

Cambridge, MA 02138

617.495.5727

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**NEW PUBLICATIONS ON TILLICH**

Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald H. Stone, eds.


(This book will be discussed at the annual meeting along with John Carey’s new book listed in the last two Newsletters)

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**TILLICH ON THE WEB**

Professor Werner Schüßler wishes to remind members of the NAPTS of several bibliographies on Paul Tillich that he has compiled and made available online. There is a direct link from the homepage of the Deutsche-Paul-Tillich-Gesellschaft under “Tillich-Literatur”:

http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/theo/tillich.html

One may also access the bibliographies directly:

http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/theo/tillit.html

http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/theo/tillit1.html

http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/theo/tillit2.html

Professor Schüßler would be grateful for additions to his work via email: schuessw@uni-trier.de

Two samples of the contents of the websites follow:

- Bibliographie der Primär-und Sekundärliteratur zu Paul Tillich
- Von Prof. Dr. Dr. Werner Schüßler Lehrstuhl für Philosophie, Theologische Fakultät Trier

Universitätsring 19, 54296 Trier

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Für bibliographische Hinweise bin ich immer dankbar!

E-mail: schuessw@uni-trier.de

1. Primärliteratur
2. Sekundärliteratur
   a) Sammelbände

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**ON THE CALENDAR**

**The Paul Tillich Lectures at Harvard**

**Fall 2002**

Ann Belford Ulanov

*Christiane Brooks Johnson Professor of Psychiatry and Religion, Union Theological Seminary, New York*

“Depth Psychology, the Demonic and Transcendence”

Tuesday, 19 November 2002

5:15 PM

The Memorial Church

Harvard University

Professor Ulanov is a psychoanalyst in private practice in New York and was a student of Paul Tillich at Harvard. In 1986, she delivered the centennial address at the annual meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society.
Introduction

In March 1959, *Time* magazine placed Paul Tillich on its cover, calling him the “foremost Protestant thinker” in the United States. In September 2001, *Time* named Stanley Hauerwas “America’s Best Theologian.” Here, I will compare the instrumentalities of salvation in these two prominent figures: the paths of individual, cultural and cosmic of healing in the apologetical approach of Tillich; and engraftment into the saving community in the anti-Tillichian, polemical strategy of Hauerwas. The argument will be that Tillich’s approach to salvation is superior to Hauerwas’s because Tillich took seriously the salvific forces operative within all of reality, understood that they existed on both sides of the church/world boundary, and always acknowledged the ambiguity with which they manifest themselves. Hauerwas, in contrast, overstates the church’s capacity to be an effective salvific instrument and dismisses the extra-ecclesiastical vehicles of salvation.

I. Paul Tillich

Paul Tillich taught that “salvation is derived from the Latin words *salvus* or *salus* which mean ‘healed’ or ‘whole’, as opposed to disruptiveness.” He called salvation “the ultimate aim of all divine

Note on the NAPTS.org website: The Newsletters should be posted online, but sometime the webmaster is delayed. A request has been made for two histories of the Society; copyright approval is awaited for one and the second has not been submitted. They will be posted as soon as they are available.
implies the possibility of reconciliation, but he believed James did not give due weight to estrangement. Tillich agreed with Marx’s description of estrangement created by capitalism, yet he doubted that the proletariat was capable of carrying on the struggle for social reconciliation. He saw Freud’s treatment of the libido and the death instinct to be quite helpful in capturing the nature of human estrangement. However, he believed Freud was unduly pessimistic about humanity, though Freudian analysis—in its potentially healing work—contradicted this pessimism. Tillich appreciated Jung’s exploration into self-estrangement and its consequence of freedom lost, yet he was perplexed as to how Jungian creative freedom could accomplish reconciliation.

Tillich took seriously such thinkers because he believed they had made specific contributions to theology in its effort to understand the personal and social dimensions of humankind. Writing in the mid-1950s, Tillich affirmed that “[t]heology has received tremendous gifts from existentialism and psychoanalysis, gifts not dreamed of 50 years ago or even 30 years ago. We have these gifts. Existentialists and analysts themselves do not need to know that they have given to theology these great things. But the theologians should know it.” As a consequence, he concluded that “modern ideas of estrangement and reconciliation [reflected in such thinkers]...must be considered as autonomous developments of fundamental Christian principles...[which Christianity should] acknowledge as bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh...[yet] elevating them at the same time beyond themselves as agape does.”

One must also understand Tillich’s thoughts on a theology of culture in this broad sense of salvation as the process of healing that is potentially present in all dimensions of human existence. Therefore, it was natural for him to probe culture to determine what within it was destructive and what was conciliatory and reconciliatory. He believed that “[e]very spiritual phenomenon of a period expresses its eternal content and one of the most important characteristics of a time has been defined when we have discovered which of the various aspects of culture is most expressive of its meaning.” This explains Tillich’s many articles on politics and culture, particularly in the 1920s. It explains what motivated his interest in The Religious Situation of the 1920s. It explains why Tillich confronted Nazism with The Socialist Decision just prior to the rise of Hitler. His willingness to write more than two years of Voice of America addresses to challenge his former compatriots to resist the Nazi terror. All of these labors sought to elucidate avenues of political and cultural healing, of salvation.

In the face of all this, to limit salvation to an ecclesiastically-bound matter of heaven or hell was to sap it of its imminent, profoundly present significance and to restrict its scope. In his Systematic Theology, Tillich explained that “healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself.” To declare Christ as Savior does not reject the healing processes in all of history: “What, then, is the peculiar character of the healing through the New Being in Jesus as the Christ? If he is accepted as the Savior, what does salvation through him mean? The answer cannot be that there is no saving power apart from him but that he is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process.”

Further, to limit salvation to the church was—for Tillich—to deny the church’s counter-salvific tendencies that attested to the church’s lower human qualities. He pointed to those who associate with the church in order to escape salvation, to avoid paths that would be legitimately healing. Tillich argued that the church operates within the same ambiguous confines of any human, communal entity. Thus, church history has “all the disintegrating, destructive, and tragic-demonic elements which make historical life as ambiguous as all other life processes.” For Tillich, to limit salvation to the church would result in a small, impotent, mangled salvation. That is why he found salvation across the broad horizons of personal, cultural, and political healing, horizons that involved limited partnerships with ambiguously salvific forces, inside and outside of the church, horizons on which care and love and justice were profoundly important.

II. Stanley Hauerwas

For Stanley Hauerwas, the church is the locus of salvation. Here—given limited space—we focus on two of his works, Resident Aliens (especially his introductory chapter) and the article/lecture, “The Politics of Salvation: Why There Is No Salvation Outside the Church.” In “The Politics of Salvation...” Hauerwas declares, “...the church is God’s salvation....” He explains what he means in this way:
If we say, outside the church there is no salvation, we make a claim about the very nature of salvation—namely that salvation is God’s work to restore all creation to the Lordship of Christ. Such a salvation is about the defeat of powers that presume to rule outside God’s providential care. Such salvation is not meant to confirm what we already know and/or experience. It is meant to make us part of a story that could not be known apart from exemplification in the lives of people in a concrete community [called church].

Salvation involves engraftment into the story of a biblically-rooted, truth-bearing tradition. As Hauerwas points out in Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, “[S]alvation is baptism into a community that has so truthful a story that we forget ourselves and our anxieties long enough to become a part of that story, a story God has told in Scripture and continues to tell in Israel and the church.” As “resident aliens,” Christians gain the lenses from the faith community through which to interpret and change the world. Rather than abiding by the universals of abstract reason, the particularism of the church community is the basis for a faithful alternative to the world. The church is the only place where people can understand the saving significance of God, humanity, and the universe in a meaningful way. This church is capable of unambiguously proclaiming, discussing, and living the truths of the gospel, a tack superior to strategies focusing on issues such as justice, human rights, and freedom. By being this sort of community, Hauerwas believes the church produces virtuous people, people of character able to confront the misguided values of a liberal society characterized by idolatrous self-sufficiency, “people who know the cost of discipleship and are willing to pay.” As Jeffrey Siker, interpreting Hauerwas, puts it, “God does not call people to approximate love by settling for justice; rather, God calls people to be perfect…imitating God’s perfection disclosed in Jesus” made “possible in the continued presence of God’s kingdom.”

Hauerwas believes the church has so compromised itself to the surrounding culture(s) that it has lost the truth of the Christian message. With the Enlightenment, this trend reached its zenith: “By being established, at least culturally established in liberal societies, it became more important that people believe rather than be incorporated into the church.” This contradicts the fact that “the world needs the church because, without the church, the world does not know who it is…Unfortunately, an accommoda-
tionist church, so intent on running errands for the world, is giving the world less and less in which to disbelieve.”

The Enlightenment, bearer of the ideological engine behind accommodation to culture, is essentially monolithic in Hauerwas’s approach. One of its central crimes was perpetuating the myth of individualism. Hauerwas assumes that “…most modern ethics begin from the Enlightenment presupposition of the isolated heroic self, the allegedly rational individual who stands alone and decides and chooses… “What I do is my own damn business. First, be sure in your heart that you are right and then go ahead. I did it because it seemed right to me. What right have you to judge me?” At another point, he continues, “Modern people like to think of themselves as independent, reasoning acting agents. Morality is an individual, personal determination of the facts, not a matter of experience, tradition, training, or community.” To his way of thinking, and understood only pejoratively, the Enlightenment equation is: human being = individualism = autonomy = freedom.

Hauerwas believes that the message of Jesus is one of communally-rooted salvation as opposed to a commission to an Enlightenment-influenced social agenda of love and justice which is “something it never claimed to be—ideas abstracted from Jesus, rather than Jesus with his people.” With our abstractions, Hauerwas believes we distort reality, trusting more in the rationally contrived formulations of our justice causes rather than the particularities reality offers us.

From Hauerwas’s perspective, the Enlightenment opened a Pandora’s box of additional difficulties related to areas such as justice, war, and existentialism. Hauerwas believes the bearers of social justice causes do not “appreciate how difficult it is to define justice, how the political structures themselves limit our definitions to what is just, and how odd it is to be Christian.” Such causes forget how deeply conflicting Christian and worldly values are, how impotent our secular political abstractions are in interfaith discussions, and how often justice movements become reduced to mere survival in their failure to take cognizance of particular historical, social, and geographical contexts.

Regarding war, Hauerwas is struck by a sense that the great “accomplishment” of the Enlightenment was to change the motivation for waging war from zeal for God to zeal to defend the nation-state. As for existentialism, Hauerwas roots it in Enlightenment rationalism and believes that “chil-
Tillich, opened the door to Hitler. Hauerwas
were not only close friends, but also that their theology was essentially the same. Emmanuel Hirsch were not only close friends, but also that their theology was essentially the same.

Hauerwas: “The Bible finds uninteresting...The Bible’s concern...the Bible seems to have little interest....” By attempting to personify a singular biblical perspective, Hauerwas sets a trap in which he is repeatedly caught. He argues as if scripture is univocal, in which such matters as community identity and worship are present while matters such as love and justice are absent. An ordinary student of scripture sees the obvious problems with this, for example, in relation to love and justice. Jesus teaches love as the great commandment, and the Johannine material sums up the essence of God as love, commanding the faithful to embody love to others. The prophetic writings of the Hebrew Bible—Jesus’ own sacred text—is saturated with demands for justice. In Amos and Isaiah, God is interested in worship unless the nation carries out justice. For Hauerwas to equate his limited position with “the Bible” is an absurdly flawed process of abstraction.

Hauerwas’s reduction of “justice” to the realm of theoretical irrelevancy out of touch with grassroots contexts is another example of distorting abstraction. One can take any social issue and point both to failures consistent with Hauerwas’s viewpoint and successful causes that roundly contradict him. For example, I have observed the fruits of the women’s movement in three generations of my own...
family with a mother who was the first woman to serve as common pleas judge in her county, a sister who was the first woman to practice medicine in her town, a wife who is the first senior pastor of her congregation, and, therefore, a daughter who has realistic dreams about a similar future. All benefited from women and men who worked to dismantle discrimination against women. Hauerwas is clearly wrong about the difficulty of defining justice in this case. Further, the issue has been about women seeking to thrive, not merely “survive” as he puts it.

Hauerwas’s version of the Enlightenment and his simplistic equation of Tillich with the Enlightenment render both unrecognizable. Hauerwas distorts the Enlightenment by flattening it into a period lacking any real complexity. This occurs both in his treatment of reason and in the lack of any reflection on the many figures and viewpoints of the centuries in question. Tillich understood that there were varied notions of reason considered in that period. From the standpoint of several intellectuals of the period, reason was understood in the context of a Creator who gives access to knowledge to humanity, hardly godless rationalism. Tillich gave account of the range of thinkers who contributed varying viewpoints on humanity’s capacity to gain full knowledge and varying viewpoints on the relationship of God to this knowledge. He showed that these thinkers had varied levels of confidence in reason to grant fulfillment to humanity. He did not endorse all of their thinking, but he weighed it. It is a multi-layered presentation in light of which Hauerwas’s is either superficial misrepresentation or distorted stereotype.

Significantly, Hauerwas reveals no cognizance of the great ambiguity, and sometimes great revolution, with which the German intellectuals of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries greeted the Enlightenment. The German romanticism and idealism that became such deep influences upon Tillich were, to a degree, anti-Enlightenment movements: “German romanticism became an ideological weapon against the foreigner, against French nationalism, and against the revolutionary spirit.” This was not an approach that limited the human to the rational and the objective but that took seriously the irrational and the subjective. In its understanding of history, German romanticism challenged the over-generalizing pragmatism of the Enlightenment’s approach, choosing “to study origins, connections, and development, and above all to study the unique aspects of a given age in its own terms.” World history became national history, and the role of the state and of political institutions supplanted the history of ideas. Diagnosing the response of German 19th century scholars—the German mandarins—to the Anglo-French rationalist tendencies of the Enlightenment, Fritz Ringer has written, “What they really disliked was a vaguely ‘utilitarian’ tendency, a vulgar attitude in the West European tradition toward all knowledge.” Instead, German scholars had Bildung or “cultivation” as their goal:

Cultivation reflects and originates in the religious and neo-humanist conceptions of ‘inner growth’ and integral self-development. The starting point is a unique individual. The materials which are ‘experienced’ in the course of learning are ‘objective cultural values….’ [The student] does not only come to know [the classical sources]. Rather, the moral and aesthetic examples contained in the classical sources affect him deeply and totally. The whole personality is involved in the act of cognition. They saw the formative experiences of cultivation as superior to Anglo-French “civilization” which was the result of “factual, rational, and technical training.” Neither individual nor community dominates, but neither is lost either.

Hauerwas simply reveals ignorance of the German process of cultivation that is actually quite close to his own understanding of the formation of personhood. He both misinterprets the Enlightenment and fails to make any effort to place Tillich within the German response to the Anglo-French manifestation of it, which leads us to his general approach to Tillich.

Hauerwas is repeatedly wrong in his interpretation of Tillich. He seems to consider Tillich’s careful consideration of varying arguments endorsement of them. Tillich was perpetually suspicious of reason separated from subjectivity. Tillich valued existentialism, as shown above, but as a source of questions for which it had no answers. Much of what Tillich finds there he finds as well in the forgotten recesses of the Christian tradition. As will be shown below, Hauerwas has thin knowledge of the Tillich of the Nazi period. Hauerwas may have significant disputes with Tillich’s thought, but one is often hard-pressed to find Tillich in the enemy Hauerwas attacks. Perhaps this explains why he cites none of Tillich’s works to substantiate his claims in either “Why There Is No Salvation Outside the Church” or Resident Aliens. Hauerwas presents his own abstraction of “Tillich.” The reader is subject to his inter-
pretive lens. The real Tillich never appears. In both cases, Hauerwas engages in sparse intellectual shadow-boxing in place of serious scholarship.

**B. History**

Hauerwas’s interpretation of German church history, where one sees the shrillest part of his treatment of Tillich’s theology, is its relationship to the rise of Nazism. His version of the tragic Nazi period reflects a partial, unsound approach to history.

As noted above, Hauerwas found “troubling” Ericksen’s account of the theological similarities between Hirsch and Tillich. Even more troubling, however, is his own interpretation of Ericksen. Ericksen states not that Hirsch’s and Tillich’s is “essentially the same”, but that they “share a greater similarity theologically than do Hirsch and Barth,” given their rootedness in the 19th century German intellectual tradition and the seriousness with which they took the ethical, the political, and the existential. In fact, Tillich disagrees with Hirsch over the degree to which the kingdom of God becomes an imminent reality because of his affinity with certain lines of Barth’s dialectical thought and, therefore, condemns Hirsch for uncritically accepting Nazism as a manifestation of that kingdom. Hauerwas fails to note that Tillich is seeking a balance between Barthian political escapism and Hirsch’s sacralization of the Nazi period.

More importantly, Hauerwas seems unaware that Barth found himself in the same position as Tillich in Barth’s relationship to Friedrich Gogarten. In that case, both Barth and Gogarten were strong dialecticians, both edited the journal *Between the Times*, yet Gogarten turned to support the rise of Nazism while Barth did not. A similar theology with differing political implications. Ericksen adds a further wrinkle to the discussion in noting “striking similarities” between Hirsch and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Hauerwas simplistically glosses over the complexity of Ericksen’s extensive description of Hirsch’s intellectual-political perspective to attack Tillich. A more truthful story Hauerwas might have told would have been the tragic rupturing of such relationships during this period.

A final word is necessary regarding Hauerwas’s treatment of the German church under Nazism. Hauerwas uses the Theological Declaration of Barmen—from the pen of Barth—as an example of the church being faithful by standing against culture. In fact, Barmen was, at core, a church independence document, written in an effort to maintain the church’s independence from Hitler’s control, and constructed so as to give expression to Barth’s “transcendental, other-worldly Christology rather than to one that was ethically, this-worldly oriented.” According to Eberhard Bethge, “the Solus Christus of Barmen encouraged the Church to adopt a ghetto-like existence and to make a false separation of the ‘two kingdoms.’” Bonhoeffer ultimately concluded that ‘the decisive factor’ with the Confessing Church was ‘being on the defensive’ with ‘unwillingness to take risks in the service of humanity.’ Thus, Barth himself had conflicting thoughts on the church-state relationship. In 1934, near the time of Barmen and prior to his expulsion from Germany, he thought “…the Church had no warrant to elevate herself as judge over the State.” Eberhard Busch observes that “it was only when he returned to Switzerland [in 1935] that Barth stressed more and more strongly that the Christian resistance to National Socialism also had a political dimension.” Thus, Barth could admit by 1944 that “the whole disaster in Germany would perhaps never have been possible had the Christian Church not for centuries accustomed itself to keep silent, when it should have witnessed and spoken up, when issues of genuinely earthly power and government and of right and freedom were at stake.” He could also confess near the end of his life that Bonhoeffer was almost alone in advocating a serious discussion of the Jewish Question and that it was a serious failure for Barth to have left the Jewish Question out of Barmen. Strangely, Barth would nevertheless claim—in spite of significant facts to the contrary—that the Confessing Church had done “as much as was humanly possible…for the persecuted Jews.” Further, despite his regrets of church inaction under Nazism, he took pride in the fact that his theologizing went on under Hitler “as if nothing had happened.”

As committed as Hauerwas is to a narrative theology rooted in a truthful story, it is surprising how truncated and sanitized his portrayal of the Confessing Church’s story under Nazism is. His portrayal of Barth is, at points, little more than hagiology. He is silent on Tillich’s relationship to the Jews. He seems unwilling to address the painful facts of his heroes along with the pleasant ones. Tillich’s years of reflection on these matters (the writings of his World War II period) are a very frank balancing of the divine with the diabolical as they were woven into German culture. One yearns for...
something closer to that sort of historical honesty in Hauerwas.

C. Ambiguity

Anyone who has experienced life in a church community must be mystified by Hauerwas’s picture of the church as the exclusive facilitator of spiritual, saving perfection. His own negative characterization of the present state of the church as Constantinian undermines his high theology of the church. His theological hero, Karl Barth, shares the same clay feet of humanness that Hauerwas shares with Tillich. Hauerwas fails to see his attempt to ignore justice (because it is difficult to define?) simply parrots the pre-politicized Barth: Barth later repents of that position. Our theological heroes point to life’s ambiguities.

It is startling to read how dismissive Hauerwas can be of the harm the church can do, once again undermining his mythic story of the church. In an article for Notre Dame Magazine, Hauerwas commented on his experience of being immersed in Catholicism as a non-Catholic professor at Notre Dame. At one point, he compared the respective atheisms of former adherents of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Speaking to the latter of the three, he writes, “I soon learned that ex-Catholics disbelieved with an intensity I could only admire.” This was a result of being marked by their direct experiences with their church and even more by their identity as children of Catholic families. Hauerwas comments, “What a wonderful gift, even if it took the rest of your life to get over it.” Through the inability to tolerate ambiguity in his view of the church, harm becomes gift.

With the illusion of the church as a community with a monopoly on saving grace, Hauerwas misses testimony to a wider view, for example, in scripture. From Abimelech of Gerar to Balaam of Pethor, from a Canaanite woman who convinces Jesus to heal her to the heroic Samaritans as heroes, salvific activity occurs outside the faith community in the Bible.

Finally, Hauerwas makes positive use of the insights of Plato and Aristotle and others outside the faith community in his work. He even puts to effective use the secular trade of brick laying as a model for discipleship and spiritual formation. Thus, Hauerwas explicitly makes use of salvific streams outside of the church, contradicting his stated position that there is no healing-saving capacity in such places. Hauerwas’s own method confirms the ambiguity of life and history that much of his rhetoric denies. Tillich’s method of correlation has much to teach him about this.

Conclusion

The late Eberhard Bethge once described his experience as a student during the first years of Nazism in this way:

The group of theological students to which I belonged was never aware that we had missed the opportunity to listen to the great Jewish thinkers of those days, including Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, and Leo Baeck, all of whom were our contemporaries in the twenties. We did not disregard them because of conscious anti-Semitism, but because we were so caught up in Barthian theology. Both Karl Barth and Bonhoeffer did not go to hear these Jewish scholars, nor did they encourage us to grasp the opportunity.

Tillich never surrendered the legitimacy of his construction of the human situation from the standpoint of Christianity. Yet he explicated that construction from an open and apologetic perspective rather than an insular and polemical one. He saw existence as a realm where many viewpoints that resonated with Christian thought abounded, and Tillich, to echo Bethge, “grasped the opportunity” to explore them and to enlighten our understanding of them, that humanity and the church would know a bit more about healing from estrangement. For this reason, his elucidation of the healing forces of salvation reaches a vast dimension compared to which Hauerwas’s understanding seems very small indeed.

1 Time (March 16, 1959), 46.
2 Time (Sept. 17, 2001).
4 Tillich, “The Impact of Pastoral Psychology…,” p. 148. Obviously, Tillich was writing in a day prior to inclusive language concerns in his use of the generic “man” in this and other passages.


7 Ibid., pp. 126-128.


12 Tillich, “The Theological Significance…” p.95; “Psychoanalysis, Existentialism…,” p.139.


15 See, for example, the relevant articles of that period ultimately published in The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) and Political Expectation (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1971) as well as volumes X and XI of the Gesammelte Werken (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999).


20 Ibid., pp.167-168.

21 Tillich, “The Impact of Pastoral Psychology…,” p.149.


23 Two things should be said about this limitation. First, this article is limited to a discussion of the potential vehicles of salvation regarding which there is a tension between Tillich and Hauerwas. Second, the limitation is one of economy: I have found Hauerwas’s writing to be so fraught with negatively provocative material that one can easily fill the margins of his books with subtleties that he ignores or glosses over or misses, as well as viable and superior opposing viewpoints such that it would take at least a book to respond to anyone of his book-length works.


27 Resident Aliens, p.146; After Christendom, pp.26,35; 1991 Henderson Lecture.

28 Ibid., p. 157.


30 After Christendom, p. 25.

31 Resident Aliens, p. 94.

32 Ibid., p. 79.

33 Ibid., p. 98.
34 1991 Henderson Lecture; Resident Aliens, p. 32.
35 *Resident Aliens*, p. 21.
37 *Resident Aliens*, p. 155.
38 1991 Henderson Lecture; *After Christendom*, p. 29.
39 *After Christendom*, p. 33.
40 *Resident Aliens*, p. 21.
41 Ibid., p. 24.
42 Ibid., pp. 20, 28.
43 Henderson Lecture.
44 *Resident Aliens*, p. 25.
46 John 15; I John 4; Isaiah 1; Amos 5.
49 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
50 Ibid., pp. 43, 45-6.
52 Ibid., 87.
53 Ibid., 90.
55 Ibid., pp. 178-80.
57 Ericksen, p 184.
58 *Resident Aliens*, pp. 24-25, 43-44.
60 Ibid., p. 148, note 103.
61 Ibid., p. 278.
62 Ibid., p. 282.
64 Gutteridge, p. 282.
65 Ibid., pp. 125, 267.
67 Stanley Hauerwas, “Pilgrim in the Promised Land, Or: How a Protestant from Pleasant Grove, Texas, found truth, goodness and some perplexing curiosities at Notre Dame,” *Notre Dame Magazine*, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95), p. 18. I assume that Hauerwas would never have written such words in the context of the present crisis within Roman Catholicism over clergy sexual misconduct.
68 Genesis 12,20; Numbers 22-24; Luke 10, 15, 18; and John 4.
One day the Pope received a telephone phone call from an archaeologist in Palestine. “Holy Father,” the voice said, “I don’t quite know how to tell you this, but we have discovered what proves beyond doubt to be the very bones of Jesus!” Hanging up, the Pope convened his closest advisors. Explaining the situation, he asked the stunned clerics for suggestions. One stammered, “Holy Father, I believe there is a theologian in America who might be able to help us. His name is Paul Tillich.” Wasting no time, the Pope called Tillich’s office in New York. “Herr Tillich, I’m afraid we have quite a problem here, and we hope perhaps you can advise us. Archaeologists in the Holy Land have discovered the bones of our Lord Jesus!” Silent seconds passed, followed by Tillich’s heavy German accent: “Ach...he lived?”

This well-known story originated in the fact that Paul Tillich, when questioned, is said to have admitted that his faith would survive intact even if it could be proven that Jesus never existed. This hadith purports to present us with a piece of radical theology, and it leads us to consider in somewhat greater detail Tillich’s published views on the historical Jesus.

Tillich is unambiguous in his admission that the “quest for the historical Jesus” was a failure. The sources at the historian’s disposal are not such as to make a biography of Jesus possible. Nor is this any accident. The reason is the very nature of the documents. The gospels are not attempts at biographies. They betray no such interest. Rather, they are testimonies of faith made by people who have become believers in Jesus Christ, receivers of the New Being made manifest in him. The quest for the historical Jesus sought to get back behind these faith-testimonies to a Jesus whose image would not be obscured by dogma and pious legend. But such an attempt not only refuses to take seriously the kerygmatic witness of these documents but also goes on to assume a fundamental incongruity between Jesus as he actually lived and the portrait of Jesus given in the gospel proclamation.

“Raiders of the historical Jesus” often made their hypothetical Jesus into a founder-teacher rather than a savior as traditionally understood by faith. But even when it became clear that the quest was doomed, that there was no hope of reconstructing Jesus as he was, this trend continued insofar as scholars still sought to make the teaching attributed to Jesus the basis for Christian theology. This way it should not matter whether this or that saying could be connected with Jesus himself with any confidence. If a particular teaching might have been borrowed from contemporary Judaism, what of it? It was the content that mattered. This approach Tillich dubs “legalistic liberalism.” This way, the teaching of (or ascribed to) Jesus functions as a Christian equivalent to Old Testament law (as, one ought to point out, it always has among the Anabaptists). This understanding must result, Tillich reckoned, in the forfeiting of grace. Tillich, of course, is viewing the matter through the lens of his inherited Lutheranism with its law/grace dichotomy.

Bultmann’s approach, Tillich says, is but slightly different. Tillich calls it “existentialist legalism.” Jesus’ message is seen not as a group of discrete teachings, universal in their application as a guide for life, but as a concrete eschatological demand: Jesus’ hearers must decide for the kingdom of God! But again, says Tillich, there is no word of grace to tell the potential believer how he is to respond, or to make such a response possible. But is this a fair representation of Bultmann? Tillich seems to have taken Bultmann’s reconstruction of Jesus’ message (cf. Jesus and the Word) and assumed that Bultmann made this the foundation of Christian theology or of the gospel message. He did not. Actually, Bultmann took his departure from the kerygma about Christ, not the preaching done by Jesus himself. This is why, for Bultmann, Jesus is not one of the voices, but only one of the presuppositions, of New Testament theology. The New Questers (Robinson, Fuchs, Ebeling, Bornkamm, Käsemann, Braun, et. al.) might be better targets for the charge of “existentialist legalism” since they do tie in Jesus’ proclamation with Christian theology in a way analogous to that suggested by Tillich for Bultmann. In fact, Bultmann’s own position is strikingly similar to Tillich’s, as we will soon see.

So these various attempts to substitute the historical reconstruction of Jesus or his teaching for the gospels’ picture of Jesus fall far short of the mark. But that is not the end of the problem. Tillich contends that when we speak of “Jesus Christ” we are saying two distinct (though inseparable) things. First, it is Jesus who is the Christ. Through him, the concrete individual Jesus of Nazareth, the New Be-
ing was manifested. Second, Jesus is the Christ only because he was recognized and received as the bearer of the New Being. This recognition demonstrates the reality of his manifestation of the new Being. The early witnesses attest it. Thus the reception is quite as important as the manifestation. One could say it is the other side of the coin. As Tillich says elsewhere, without the reception of revelation there has been no revelation. It is precisely here that the “quest for the historical (i.e., non-gospels) Jesus” badly missed the point, as far as Tillich is concerned. The gospels as testimonies enshrine for us the reception of the New Being as manifested in Jesus Christ. Seen this way, to disregard and to bypass the gospels’ interpretation of Jesus Christ is to miss or even to deny the Christ side of Jesus the Christ. The resulting reconstruction might be of antiquarian interest but would have not a thing to do with the New Being. This view is directly parallel to that of Bultmann. Bultmann holds that the only Christ we could possibly be interested in religiously is the Risen Lord of the kerygma. To go behind this preaching of the Easter faith, asking, “What was Jesus really like?” is surely a legitimate historical inquiry, not to be squelched in the name of dogma. But we cannot but repudiate such a quest if its motive is a search for a religious security (as with Ritschl and with the Jesus Seminar today).

Before considering Tillich’s alternative in greater detail, it is important to focus briefly on an important issue underlying the whole discussion. Tillich shows himself very sensitive to the danger implied in both the fundamentalist repudiation of historical criticism on the one hand and the liberal quest for the historical Jesus on the other. Both approaches in the last analysis tend to make the believer’s faith in Jesus dependent on the probabilities of historical research. Fundamentalists find themselves defending the most precarious and improbable apologetical arguments in order to safeguard the gospel portrait of Jesus as historically invariant. Liberals’ reconstructions of Jesus and his teachings are so tenuous and arbitrary that no two liberals come up with the same reconstruction! In both cases, not only is it true that faith is being trivialized to the level of holding more or less probable opinions, but the believer is deprived of any real security of faith. His confidence is either suspended on a thin apologetical thread ready to snap at any moment, or it is blown about by every wind of changing historical theory. Surely faith must rest on a more certain foundation, immune to the uncertainties of historical scholarship.

In this concern, Tillich reflects his predecessors Wilhelm Herrmann and Martin Kähler. Herrmann writes: “It is a fatal drawback that no historical judgment, however certain it may appear, ever attains anything more than probability. But what sort of a religion would that be which accepted a basis for its convictions with the consciousness that it was only probably safe?” He continues: “It is a fatal error to attempt to establish the basis of faith by means of historical investigation. The basis of faith must be something fixed; the results of historical study are continually changing.” Likewise, Kähler says: “The attachment of the certainty of Christian conviction to the unpredictable results of historical research [is] a stumbling block…I have become increasingly certain that my Christian faith cannot have a causal connection with the ‘authenticity’ of the Gospels.”

Tillich is quick to point out the corollary of this reassurance. If faith cannot rest on historical research, neither can it control historical research. Too often it tries to do just that. The orthodox apologists sought to control the reading of the gospel data according to prior, arbitrary dogma. Liberals created various “historical Jesuses” in their own liberal Protestant images. No, says Tillich, though faith may indeed illuminate the reading of a historical text, this is a religious experience, not a method of historiography.

If faith cannot guarantee in advance certain historical conclusions, just what, if anything, can it guarantee? Nothing but itself, but that is to say quite a lot. Faith is the guarantee of the New Being in the concrete, finite life of the believer. This is a matter of present experience, not of historical probability. And in a sort of chain reaction manner, this certitude implies the historical existence of another concrete life in whom the New Being was first made manifest. Where do we find a representation of this life? We find it in the New Testament portrait of Jesus. Historical criticism cannot guarantee any given facet of the picture, not even the sure attribution of the name “Jesus” to the figure. Nonetheless, this picture in its general outline certainly enshrines the impression the disciples had of this “Christ.” And it is through this picture that men and women now find the New Being themselves, as they have for the past two thousand years.

Here again one may observe a strong similarity between Tillich on the one hand and Herrmann and Kähler on the other, despite the real differences between the three. Tillich notes appreciatively Herrmann’s attempts to approach Christ by the ave-
nue of Christian experience. He objects that Herrmann “psychologized” rather than “ontologized” Jesus as the New Testament itself does. Nonetheless, the basic similarity is important. Herrmann also seems to work backward from the believer’s experience of Jesus Christ thanks to the gospel portrait of him to the substantial reliability of that picture in portraying Jesus. As Herrmann says: “[W]hen we speak of the historical Christ we mean that life of Jesus which speaks to us from the New Testament, as the disciples’ testimony to their faith, but which, when we perceive it, always comes home to us as a miraculous revelation. That historical research cannot give us this we know. But neither will it ever take this from us by any of its discoveries. This we believe, the more we experience the influence that this picture of the glory of Jesus has upon us.”

Kähler also disagrees with Herrmann in making a psychological sketch of Jesus the basis for the origin and transmission of faith in Christ. Yet he joins him in talking in terms of the effectiveness of the biblical picture of Christ as the catalyst for faith, as well as its ultimate origin in Jesus himself. “[W]hat was the decisive influence that Jesus had upon posterity? According to the Bible and church history it consisted in nothing else but the faith of his disciples, their conviction that in Jesus they had found the conqueror of guilt, sin, temptation, and death.” Elsewhere, he says, “If now, with the due recognition given to their differences, the first eyewitnesses were nevertheless in agreement on the picture of Christ which they handed down... then this picture must have been impressed upon their hearts and minds with an incomparable and indelible preciseness rich in content.”

For Kähler, like Tillich, this picture is that of the New Testament gospels, not some “historical Jesus” reconstruction. Tillich said of Kähler’s work: “I do not believe that Kähler’s answer to the question of the historical Jesus is sufficient for our situation today.” But despite his declaration of disagreement with Herrmann and Kähler at some points, Tillich’s position is fundamentally similar. All three begin with the Christian’s experience of the New Being (freedom from sin, etc.) as mediated by the New Testament picture of Jesus, which experience in turn guarantees the substance of that picture as a portrayal of Jesus’ effect on the original disciples and evangelists. All three seem to feel they have paid adequate tribute to historical criticism by allowing that any particular detail of the Jesus picture may be questioned. Yet have they paid the devil his due? Or are they still in danger of having their faith undermined by historical delving?

Van A. Harvey contends that such schemas as these remain dependent on a historical judgment that the New Testament picture of Jesus must represent a real person and not, say, an abstract allegorical character or a wholly fictive protagonist. Kähler anticipates this criticism and contends that sinful men could not invent such a portrait of a sinless Jesus. Nonetheless, Herrmann is content to let the overpowering experience of Jesus’ inner life (as conveyed by the biblical picture of him) overrule any doubts that the believer is dealing with a total abstraction instead of a real person. What artificial abstractions have been added to the gospel portrait are of the same character as the reality itself and only tend to reinforce it. That is, people would have been tempted to embroider the Jesus tradition only with sayings or stories that rang true to the historical Jesus, even if some of those things he didn’t actually say or do.

Tillich certainly seems to leave himself open to Harvey’s criticism. Tillich admits that if the portrait of Jesus were a created fiction, or an abstraction, this would be insufficient. “Without the concreteness of the New Being, its newness would be empty.” “A picture imagined by the same contemporaries of Jesus would have expressed this untransformed existence and their quest for a New Being. But it would not have been the New Being.” In other words, even if his name turned out not to be “Jesus,” the existence of an individual corresponding to the New Testament portrait is necessary to Christian faith. Tillich admits that even the barest theoretical possibility that the Jesus of the biblical records did not exist would be “destructive for the Christian faith.”

It seems that Harvey is correct in charging that Tillich has not succeeded in bridging the gap of uncertainty. The place of Jesus in Christian faith remains dependent on a historical judgment, i.e., that the gospels’ picture of Jesus actually represents a real historical individual of whatever name. In addition, Harvey points out, the contours of this picture of Jesus may well vary with the exegete who tries to present it (shades of the quest for the historical Jesus!). “Even this ‘picture of Christ’ in the New Testament, of which Kähler and Tillich speak as though it were independent of criticism, can be abstracted only by an act of historical imagination.”

Harvey proposes his own alternative, drawing on the thought of H. Richard Niebuhr. He suggests that an image of Jesus may function as a revelatory para-
digm, an image “cast up” by the original event (whatever that may have been, and Harvey admits we cannot know). This image “does illuminate our experience and our relationship to that upon which we are absolutely dependent.” “The power of the Christian message is mediated through the image of Jesus. It is this image which the Christian finds to be a reliable one for relating himself to the Beings around him and to the power acting in and through all Beings.”

To be thus effective, the image need have no connection with historical facts, though there may be reasons for thinking it does.

It seems to me that Harvey’s alternative is more consistent with Tillich’s desire to deliver faith from the threatening tentativeness of historical judgments than is Tillich’s own answer. In fact, Harvey’s model naturally follows from Tillich’s statement that all faith can guarantee is its own experience of the New Being mediated by the picture of Jesus Christ. To go any further, as Tillich tries to do, and to conclude that this picture must represent a historical individual is to make faith responsible for a theoretically debatable historical judgment. And as long as faith guarantees that its own experience is truly that of the New Being under the conditions of human finitude, isn’t this enough? Does faith somehow need to believe that the effective catalytic picture also came from a factual experience of the New Being in conditions of finitude, that of a historical Jesus? Tillich himself hints that such a belief is not a necessary implication of the experience of the New Being. He indicates this when he allows that the New Being is at work even where Jesus is not known at all.

So does the joke with which we began accurately depict Tillich’s opinion? In one way, no, for he obviously believed in the historical existence of Jesus. In another way, yes, since with Harvey’s correction of Tillich, Tillich’s thinking would be compatible with a denial of a historical Jesus (which some aver that in private he admitted).

Finally, it may seem odd for Tillich to sound so concerned as if to find some way of hermetically sealing off faith from tormenting doubt. Isn’t he famous for claiming that faith includes doubt and is by no means antithetical to doubt? Indeed. But remember Tillich’s typology of doubt. He has no respect for skeptical doubt, that cynical ennui that cares not to commit itself to any belief or cause, whether because of prior disillusionment or just laziness. He has great respect for methodological doubt, the epistemological tool of both scientific and historical investigation. He believes, of course, that faith neither faces a threat from such scrutiny nor has any right to suspend such doubt (and in the former case, we would be dealing with the intellectualistic distortion of faith, while in the latter we would be suffering from the voluntaristic distortion of faith). The only kind of doubt relevant to faith is existential doubt, the nagging uneasiness that one’s commitment to a concern as one’s ultimate concern may possibly prove to have been idolatrous, as when an idealistic campaign worker for a reformist candidate finds he has wasted his efforts on one more corrupt politician.

It seems to me that the sort of doubt relevant to the historical Jesus problem would be existential doubt, and it would take this form: do our hearts condemn us as we examine our own ostensible experience of the New Being? When we look to the examples of our co-religionists and forbears in the New Being, in the Christian community, do we really behold evidence of a New Being, or are we allowing slogans to substitute for reality? The relevant (and perhaps terrifying) element of doubt occurs not on the far end of the historical/experiential corridor, the long chain that stretches between our experience and the gospel portrait of Jesus as the Christ, but rather on the near end. Tillich took for granted that we have a transforming experience of the New Being based on encounter with the Jesus-picture (Galatians 3:1); doubts began to arise as to whether this portrait was historically sound. And the threat (which faith, by its nature as ultimate concern, should not have to fear) was that of methodological doubt. Tillich sought to quiet that doubt by reasoning backward from the supposedly sure experience of the believer to the powerful efficacy, hence historical soundness, of the first cause of our experience, the portrait of Jesus. He ought rather to have located the threat of doubt in the eye of the beholder of the Jesus-portrait: are we sure we have contracted the happy contagion of the New Being? Perhaps Christ is not our ultimate concern, despite our protestations of devotion. Or perhaps the Christian confession is not what it is cracked up to be, hence an idol. These would be appropriate existential doubts.

3 Suppose it turned out that, as some have suggested, “Jesus” was at first a title and had come to supplant the savior’s birth name, now lost. Or suppose it was someone else who first manifested the New Being, but Jesus got credit for it, as in Michael Moorcock’s novel Behold the Man. But there may be unintended consequences to Tillich’s view. Suppose it turned out it was not Jesus on the cross but someone else at the last moment, like Simon of Cyrene, as Basilides thought? Would it matter? Some accused Bultmann, with his talk of the “das” of Jesus, regardless of the “was” of Jesus, of embracing docetism. Tillich might be ripe for the same accusation.

4 Herrmann, 77-78.

5 Kähler, 63, 88.

6 Paul Tillich, Preface to Kähler, xii.

7 Kähler, 79. Cf. Descartes’ insistence that, as an imperfect mind, he could never have dreamed up the shape of a perfect circle, so it must have an independent existence outside his mind, etc.

8 Herrmann, p. 75.

9 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. II, Existence and the Christ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 114, 115. One is reminded of Bultmann’s contention that one may know about love from reading romance novels, but one can know love for oneself only by entering into a relationship with another, and so with authentic existence. The secular existentialist may grasp the idea, but only the Christian may experience it.

10 Ibid., 113.

11 As if the belief in a historical Jesus behind the miracles and legends of the gospels were not already a mouth-full of a historical judgment! One suspects a dogmatic agenda when Bultmann questions the sanity of anyone who would venture to doubt the historical existence of Jesus. He wants, like Tillich, to seem to be starting at square one when he isn’t. The scholarly debate over the Christ Myth theory has only grown more vigorous.


13 Ibid., 282, 283.

14 Think for instance of the powerful portraits of Jesus rendered by modern fictive gospels like Tim Rice’s Jesus Christ Superstar, Nikos Kazantzakis’’s The Last Temptation of Christ, and Dostoyevski’s “The Grand Inquisitor” parable.

EDITOR’S NOTE: The following paper was written by a senior undergraduate at Santa Clara University in the Spring 2002 Quarter. It was awarded the Theodore J. Mackin Prize for the best undergraduate thesis in Religious Studies. It is being published for several reasons: first, to motivate young scholars to work on Tillich’s thought; second, to encourage teachers to look for publishable papers in the Newsletter in the Fall issue.

AN ONTOLOGY OF DEPRESSION

Jessica Heller

Introduction

In a culture where the prevalence of diagnosed depression has skyrocketed and therapy and antidepressants have become accepted practice, it seems a call to a deeper examination of the foundations of depression is necessary. At the heart of the problem of depression is the human person: who he or she is, how he or she understands him or herself, and how he or she relates to a broader world. Traditionally the question of the human person has been the province of philosophy; in classical philosophy, metaphysics or ontology. Metaphysics or ontology unlocks the mystery of being itself and along with this the deepest reality of the human person. Perhaps returning to an ontological understanding of the person might shed light on the problem of depression.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ontological structure of depression in light of the works by the psychologist Viktor Frankl and the theologian Paul Tillich. While the methodologies that support their theories have been challenged by fellow psychologists and theologians, I seek to illustrate that each thinker operates appropriately within his own respective fields. By unconventionally approaching a common ground, Frankl and Tillich shed light on the works of one another and illuminate an area of human nature that some claim only God could really know—the human psyche.

My hope is that this paper can serve as a source of dialogue between psychology and theology as each intellectual discipline seeks to unearth the structure of human existence. Tillich emphasizes the importance of dialogue between philosophy and psychology when he says: “Psychoanalysis and existentialism have been connected with each other from the very beginning; they have mutually influenced each other in the most radical ways.”

While
it is unquestioningly presumptuous to equate theology with existentialism, it is reasonable to suggest their boundaries blur together. Britt-Mari Sykes, in her study of Tillich and Frankl, also emphasizes the importance of cross-analysis from different fields of thoughts. As she says: “To approach human nature from only one perspective...distorts the reality of human existence. Human existence is, Frankl and Tillich both argue, ambiguous, fraught with inherent contradictions.” 2 While theologians my seek to understand the logos of the Divine and psychologists the logos of human psyche in thought and behavior, both disciplines seek meaning; from different perspectives and with different methods, they seek to understand the purpose and aim of human life.

In what follows, I hope to present the theories of both Frankl and Tillich, in so far as they find points of convergence in order to illuminate the darkness of the human psyche so visible in the experience of depression. After briefly examining the basic prevailing understandings of depression in contemporary psychology, I will use Tillich’s ontology as a lens into my own experiences of depression. In doing so I will link the therapeutic perspectives of Viktor Frankl and the ontological vision of Paul Tillich.

My academic interest in depression stems directly from personal experience with depression. Since my first diagnosis with major depression at fifteen, I have become increasingly aware of how significant and widespread the effects of depression are. I have witnessed the depth of suffering in close family members and friends caused by depression. Occasionally, through the self-revelation of a casual acquaintance or academic colleague, I learn more of the effects of depression. Yet with each new encounter, I am struck by the commonality of individuals’ experiences.

A psychological perspective of depression

Most human beings experience a period of depression or anxiety at some point in their lives; some seem to experience depressive moments all their lives. While medical science has correlated the experience of depression to biochemical processes, there is no doubt that it is also rooted in cognitive and emotional processes as well. I contend that depression often stems out of a spiritual anxiety about the meaning and fullness of one’s life. I intend to illustrate the ontological underpinnings of depression in its relationship to the ontological nature of anxiety.

By relating Paul Tillich’s work in *The Courage to Be* with Victor Frankl’s experience in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and his psychosocial approach called logotherapy as it is described in his book *Man’s Search for Meaning*, a search for the nature and the meaning of depression in the person will ensue.

Depression and anxiety, the most commonly diagnosed psychological disorders, are intimately linked; a significantly high proportion of individuals diagnosed with an anxiety disorder are also diagnosed with depression. 3 Anxiety and depression are noted specifically by psychologists, as opposed to any other psychological disorder, as risk factors for suicide. 4 The medical world recognizes a commonality in the potential outcomes as well as their symptoms, and reasonable inferences suggest a commonality in origin. Unipolar major depression, as described by the DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition), is characterized by the following symptoms for a period of two or more weeks: depressed mood, diminished interest or pleasure, significant weight gain or loss, insomnia or hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness or guilt, diminished cognitive ability, lack of concentration, indecisiveness, and recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation. 5 While there are many specific forms of anxiety, anxiety can be generally described by health professionals as “a blend of thoughts and feelings” that reflect a “sense of uncontrollability and unpredictability over potentially aversive life events.” 6 However, these descriptions or diagnostic criteria serve only to create a uniform vocabulary with which to discuss these complex human phenomena. Such organized descriptions of depression and anxiety command further examination into the etiology of these pervasive human phenomena. Paul Tillich and Viktor Frankl have heeded the call for deeper examination.

While it is most likely a culmination of biological, psychological, and spiritual causes, the origin of depression has been a source of constant questioning for me. From my four years of study in psychology, I question myself whether my depression reflects a physiological abnormality or maladaptive cognitive and emotive processes. The difficulty in answering this question produces a troubling dilemma. Am I a powerless victim of my body chemistry or am I simply incapable of coping with a somewhat ordinary life? Where does the responsibility lie?
The unconventional examination of a theologian and a psychologist

Paul Tillich has been challenged as to his legitimacy of the title “theologian.” In his Preface to Tillich’s The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Christian Message, Durwood Foster says:

Though his view were always under fire from both the theological right and the left...He relentlessly insisted that authentic theology—and all the more so authentic preaching—must speak to the burning issues of human life. The failure of conventional “God-talk” to take those issues seriously provoked his quip that nowadays, “To be a theologian one has to be a non-theologian.”

I suggest that while his methodology was unconventional, the focus of his thought centered thoroughly on the sacred. Part of his genius, however, lies in the fact that he can reach legitimate theological conclusions through somewhat unconventional means. Generally, conventional approaches to theological study begins with examination of sacred texts and scriptures or authority-sanctioned traditions and practices. As a pastor and a preacher, Tillich was, in a traditional sense, a man of God and a man of the people. It was not his role nor his practice that was unconventional, but his approach that challenged traditional theological study. Instead of using the traditional top-down approach, which often seeks to understand what God is revealing about our humanity, Tillich uses a bottom-up method that seeks to understand what our humanity reveals about God. Through Tillich’s mystical and sacramental worldview, he observed God’s creations in order to access their creator. In other words, he sought to use this fundamental relationship between Creator and Created to gain insight towards person’s Ultimate Concern.

Viktor Frankl, likewise, pushed the boundaries of convention when he developed his trademark therapeutic technique. As trained scientist and a skilled physician, Frankl’s use of personal experience to develop psychological theory and therapy has also been criticized as lacking in substantive systematic and empirical research methods. The critical eye of contemporary psychology would question Frankl’s findings by highlighting the weaknesses of irreplicability, sampling bias, possible distortions in self-reported data, and possible experimenter bias. Robert Rosenthal speaks about experimenter bias in all psychological research when he says: “Quite unconsciously, a psychologist interacts in subtle ways with the people he is studying so that he may get the response he expects to get.” I suggest that Frankl used authentic and legitimate methods acceptable to the field of psychology because of the pivotal role that direct observation, a fundamental method of the scientific approach, played in the development of his theories. Highly respected and accepted in the humanist theoretical perspective of psychology with other psychologists such as Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, Frankl was acknowledged within the psychological community for his contributions.

Frankl has also been criticized, within the discipline of psychology, for his unconventional questions that broach the disciplines of religion and philosophy. Britt-Mari Sykes characterizes this criticism when she cites:

...you [Frankl] have unabashedly related secular therapeutics to matters of ultimate concern, about which Tillich has written so much...Another critic commented that...in spite of his rise to prominence in psychology...Frankl’s impact on research and academic psychology has been limited by the philosophical and religious approach favored by Frankl and his followers.9

Frankl responded to a question of his own personal religiosity in 1995 interview, stating: “I do not allow myself to confess personally whether I am religious or not. I am writing as a psychologist, I am writing as a psychiatrist, I am writing as a man of the medical faculty.”10 While Frankl’s work has been recognized as bringing new insight to psychological matters, clearly he has been questioned by his colleagues for the lack of empiricism and his emphasis on “matters of ultimate concern.”

Another aspect of Frankl’s work that made in him “unconventional” was that, while most psychologists focus on the “abnormal” or unhealthy individual, Frankl focused on common human experience. As implied in the title of his work, Man’s Search For Meaning, Frankl suggests that every person experiences a sense of searching and longing during his life. Frankl further suggests that man’s Being is searching for meaning; to use Tillichian terminology, man’s Being is searching for Ultimate Concern.11

At first glance, this parallel seems a difficult transition. I believe that this is due to the traditional connotations surrounding the words “meaning” and “concern.” While meaning can be understood as in-
individual and fluid, I believe that Frankl is speaking of something much less cerebral; while ultimate concern is understood to be Tillich’s modern interpretation of God, I believe that he is speaking of something much more personal. Therefore, their terminologies become more similar in both form and substance. While it is a disservice to either thinker simply to equate one with the other, allowing some flexibility in comparing and contrasting their terms illuminates the philosophies set forth by each.

Interestingly, while both Tillich and Frankl use unconventional methodologies in their respective fields, they both seem to be converging on the same point by using different questions from their respective fields: Why has my Creator created me? And, how can I cope in a world filled with darkness and disappointment? As Frankl pursues man’s search for meaning and Tillich pursues the Ultimate Concern, I suggest that both Frankl and Tillich are seeking to discern Logos, the ultimate structure of the Universe.

When I first read Viktor Frankl’s works in high school, I was moved by his experiences in the Holocaust and his ability to survive. Now I understand clearly that his achievement was not mere survival. His deepest achievement was his ability to triumph over unimaginable atrocities and, in the depths of the unimaginable, was able to live.

An Ontology of Anxiety

Paul Tillich, in his section called “Ontology of Anxiety” from The Courage To Be, suggests that the Universe can be understood in two essential forms, being and nonbeing. Being can be defined as the “basic self-affirmation of a being in its simple existence.” The categories of Being and non-being are proportionate to one another. As human beings, the potentiality and the reality of nonbeing confronts us in experiences with death, rejection, failure, and so on. We then recognize our impermanence and lack of control not only of our external life, but of our internal life as well. Tillich explains: “Anxiety is the existential awareness of nonbeing. ‘Existential’ in this sentence means that it is not the abstract knowledge of nonbeing which produces anxiety but the awareness that nonbeing is a part of one’s own being.” He also makes a clear distinction between fear and anxiety; fear has an object and anxiety does not. Tillich emphasizes the interrelationship of fear and anxiety. He says:

The sting of fear is anxiety, and anxiety strives toward fear. Fear is being afraid of something...But in the anticipation of the threat originating in these things, it is not the negativity itself which they bring upon the subject that is frightening but the anxiety about the possible implications of this negativity.15

Tillich describes three categories of anxiety: relative fate and absolute death, relative guilt and absolute condemnation, and relative emptiness and absolute meaninglessness. Tillich discusses neurosis as an extreme response, or a coping mechanism, to deal with anxiety. He defines pathological anxiety or neurosis as “the way of avoiding non-being by avoiding being. In the neurotic state self-affirmation is not lacking; it indeed can be very strong and emphasized. But the self which is affirmed is a reduced one.” I suggest that depression is a response, like neurosis, to the anxiety over the emptiness and meaninglessness of our lives.

Before discussing neurosis or depression, the human coping responses to ontological anxiety, Tillich’s three categories of anxiety must be further developed. Anxiety surrounding fate and death is the most basic, fundamental, and “inescapable” human anxiety. Tillich speaks candidly when he says: “For existentially everybody is aware of the complete loss of self which biological extinction implies.” We come face to face with our impermanence. Relative fate correlates with absolute death, as it is our ultimate lack of control regarding this impermanence. Secondly, anxiety regarding guilt and condemnation is a response to the human self-affirmation. In other words, the person himself is required not only to take responsibility, but access his personal responsibility, for his actions and for his self-affirmation. When examined carefully, he realizes that nonbeing is also interwoven within this self-affirmation—and guilt sets in. He must face that he is imperfect. Total rejection of this imperfect self results in an experience of condemnation. Finally, there is an anxiety that addresses the emptiness and meaninglessness or the threat of nonbeing to the spiritual life. Through doubt, we find that our participation in life is empty and, thus, our efforts are void of any spiritual meaning.

Neurosis essentially limits and reduces the quantity of life experience to particular perimeters. Thus, the threat of nonbeing is reduced and anxiety somewhat alleviated. The inadvertent consequence of this coping mechanism is that a proportionate amount of Being is also reduced and the individual
has a limited scope within which to explore and understand his or her own humanity. Depression seems to be, like neurosis, a coping mechanism. In depression, however, there is less of an outward attempt to filter life experience (which contains Being and nonbeing), but more of an inward attempt to filter the internalization of these life events. Lack of feelings, or apathy, is essential for the depressed person to cope with life. If one “shuts down” his or her emotions surrounding his or her life events, he or she limits the quality of these life experiences. Like neurosis, the threat of nonbeing is reduced and anxiety somewhat alleviated. Like neurosis, a proportionate amount of Being is reduced and the ability to explore and understand his or her own humanity and human potential is blunted.

Frankl is also most relevant to this ontological look at anxiety as he deals directly with spiritual anxiety and its resulting depression. Specific parallels exist between the ontological anxieties and the corresponding coping mechanisms of neurosis and depression, as outlined by Tillich, and the stages of a prisoner, as described by Frankl in the autobiographical account of Man’s Search for Meaning. The first part of Frankl’s book is an autobiographical recollection of his experience of the concentration camps. He outlines the various psychological stages of the prisoner: the period following his arrival at the camp, the period within the depth of the camp experience, and the period following his release as a liberated man. Without straying too far from the thrust of this study, it is interesting to note the uncanny correlation between Tillich’s three types of anxiety and Frankl’s three stages of the prisoner. The “period following the prisoner’s arrival at camp” correlates with ontic anxiety of fate and death. Frankl specifically indicates a prisoner’s ontic anxiety when he says a prisoner’s main concern was related to “keeping oneself and one’s closest friends alive.”

Frankl’s “period within the depth of the camp experience” clearly parallels with Tillich’s spiritual anxiety of emptiness and meaningless as Frankl describes on the pervasive sense of apathy and numerous suicide attempts within the camp. Finally, the “period following his release,” as described by Frankl, reflects Tillich’s explanation of moral anxiety of guilt and condemnation. Describing the aftermath of release from the concentration camps, Frankl declares: “Woe to him who found that the person whose memories alone had given him the courage in camp did not exist anymore! Woe to him who, when the day of his dreams came, found it so different from all he had longed for!” The sense of aloneness and disillusionment of surviving prisoners epitomized Frankl’s statement: “A man who for years had thought he had reached the absolute limit of all possible sufferings now found that suffering had no limits, and he could suffer still more, and still more intensely.” One wonders, in the face of unending suffering, if he or she was and is worthy of his or her sufferings; one wonders if they are condemned to suffer eternally. I suggest that the parallels between Frankl’s and Tillich’s separate and independent analyses of human anxiety support an argument for the commonality of the human persons’ experiences of anxiety.

While Frankl depicts the many aspects of camp existence of which to fear, he emphasizes the anxiety—the spiritual anxiety of the prisoner. He notes that all prisoners at one point or another had suicidal ideation. He says: “It was born out of the hopelessness of the situation, the constant danger of death looming over us daily and hourly.” Frankl articulates the reality of Tillich’s anxiety of fate and death. Quickly, Frankl moves on the second psychological stage when the prisoner is entrenched in the daily rhythm of camp life. Frankl describes this transition: “The newly arrived prisoner experienced the tortures of other most painful emotions, all of which he tried to deaden...The prisoner [then] passed from the first to the second phase: the phase of relative apathy, in which he achieved a kind of emotional death.” The apathy referred to here is the type of apathy alluded to in previous discussion. Such apathy, as Frankl explains, is a coping mechanism, an ontological response as life became increasingly empty and less meaningful.

Even in the most theoretically sound psychological, physiological, or even ontological understanding of depression, the darkest aspect of depression, apathy, remains a debilitating problem. In apathy, one has neither the ability to assert Being nor even non-being. Existence is simply void. The apathetic response of the depressed individual can be the most profoundly disturbing component of depression.

Logotherapy

Frankl himself dealt with this anxiety by utilizing his training and creative passion as a psychiatrist to help other prisoners find meaning in their bleak existence. In essence, Frankl found meaning by helping others find meaning. As a scientist and a
scholar, Frankl used his experience in the concentration camp to observe, experience, gather information, and synthesize, eventually forming a philosophy that he calls logotherapy.

Frankl describes the essence of logotherapy by relating a previous conversation regarding the difference between psychoanalysis and logotherapy:

“During psychoanalysis, the patient must lie down on a couch and tell you things that sometimes are very disagreeable to tell.” Whereupon I immediately retorted with the following improvisation: “Now in logotherapy that patient may remain sitting erect, but he must hear things that are sometimes very disagreeable to hear.”

In his therapy, Frankl emphasizes surrender to oneself and to the individual’s painful or anxiety-producing experience. He embraced life, asking not what he expected from life, but what life expected from him. This was an approach he used not only in therapy, but in his day to day to struggles, as well as his counseling in the concentration camp. Throughout the book he refers to a quote from Nietzsche: “He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how.” Man’s Search for Meaning can become, as Tillich might describe it, one’s Ultimate Concern.

What happens when this search for meaning, this ultimate concern, is thwarted? “Man’s will to meaning can also be frustrated.” This logotherapy terms “existential frustration.” For Frankl, “existential” can imply three things: existence itself, the meaning of existence, and the “striving to find concrete meaning in personal existence—the will to meaning” (i.e. finding the “why”). He follows with the clear statement that “existential frustration can also result in neurosis.” This understanding coincides perfectly with Tillich’s ontological approach in his ontology of anxiety. In his writings, we find the exact same conclusion: the human response to existential frustration or ontic anxiety can often be neurosis. Prevalence of existential frustration, and resulting neurosis, is evident in contemporary culture. Shelves of bookstores are lined with pop-psychology, self-help, and new age spirituality books. While the substance of this literature may, in actuality, have a great deal to offer, I believe their popularity reflects a cultural expression of existential frustration. With technological advancement of “how” to live, we, as a culture, are searching for a “why” to live. When Tillich’s anxiety of non-being or Frankl’s existential frustration becomes too overwhelming, the neurotic individual limits the quality of his or her life and avoids Being. As discussed at the beginning of this paper, issues of mental health are currently of widespread concern in contemporary culture.

Frankl conveys that most of his patients came to him in a state he refers to as an “existential vacuum.” This is most basically the lack of feeling or apathy, so often referred to throughout the course of this study. In Frankl’s logotherapy, he seeks not to find an ultimate meaning for all humanity; in fact, he suggests that no such meaning exists. Instead, he endeavors to help each individual to find his or her own meaning—to find “why” so that one can endure any “how.”

Through his method of logotherapy, Frankl is essentially suggesting a method of how to find, in Tillichian terms, the courage to be. Through logotherapy one is discovering how to self-affirm in spite of the various circumstances one encounters. To quote Blaise Pascal again: “Despite the sight of all the miseries which affect us and hold us by the throat, we have an irrepressible instinct which bears us up.” This quote points to the human capacity to endure and the courage to be.

In light of the psychological framework that examines abnormality or deficits within individuals, the applicability of Frankl’s logotherapy to common or universal human experience seems contradictory. While traditional psychotherapy deals with pathology, Frankl’s existentialist therapy, logotherapy, deals with issues applicable potentially to all people. A discrepancy in the aim of therapy seems to exist. I believe Frankl is pushing the envelope far beyond contradiction. I believe he is making a statement about humanity: we area all lacking; we are all broken. The human search is a search for meaning, a search for healing.

**The courage to despair: an ontology of suicide**

Depression is a response to spiritual anxiety, the anxiety surrounding the emptiness and meaninglessness of our lives. In my own experience with recurrent depression, I have seen clearly the process and pattern of a depressive episode. Often (but not always) precipitated by some sort of life change or additional external stress, self-doubt and worry slowly creep into my psyche. Questions of purpose and feelings of meaningless become part of the navel-sitting and repetitive chant that threatens my Being.

Spiraling downward into darkness, the grip of nonbeing takes hold. I feel as if nonbeing is swallowing me, drowning me, and I am helpless and
hopeless against this power that seems so much greater and so much stronger than I. Then my feelings are blunted and emotive processes shut down. Then the lack of feeling, apathy (as previously described), sets in and forms a protective shell around myself like that of a tortoise. Yet this shell cannot filter out everything and nonbeing seems to render unrelentlessly near mortal blows. This deepest low becomes a point of decision; for better or for worse, I take hold of all that seems left—the ability to make a choice. At minimum, I can make a choice that affirms the essence of my Being; I can choose between Being in life and non-being in death.

My own experience with both anxiety and depression seems relatively common in human experience. With three attempts at antidepressant medications and a family history of depression and anxiety, it seems clear that biology and genetics play a significant role in the periods of darkness that threaten my mind. Yet that physical component cannot account completely for an experience so powerful that it invades my thoughts, my emotions, and my spirit. From what I can discern, just as each person is unique, each person’s experience of depression will be unique as well. I believe firmly, however, that the overarching principles suggested by both Frankl and Tillich have great applicability as they aim to uncover the quintessential human experience.

At my lowest and darkest point, like most depressed people, suicidal ideation became a common, sometimes daily, daydream-like thought. Tillich addresses the issue of suicide and insightfully expresses the interior war of the depressive. He says:

Nonbeing is felt as absolutely victorious… Enough being is left to feel the irresistible power of nonbeing, and this is the despair within despair… He wants to get rid of itself—and it cannot… If anxiety were only the anxiety of fate and death, voluntary death would be the way out of despair. The courage demanded would be the courage not to be. The final form of ontic self-affirmation would be the act of ontic self-negation.

As a response to anxiety of fate and death, such ontic self-negation (suicide) might be a viable solution. However, as a response to spiritual anxiety, anxiety surrounding the emptiness and meaninglessness of life, suicide can never truly be a solution. One can destroy one’s life but not the meaning of one’s life. Tillich is quick to point that ultimately that such an act of self-negation is really a final act of self-affirmation. One finds that the courage to be lies now within their ability to make a choice between death or life.

Whether one chooses death or life, suicide or healing, the courage to be eventually must take hold. The Courage to be is “self-affirmation in spite of,” that is, in spite of non-being. While suicide may appear contradictory to being, Tillich reconciles this paradox quite clearly in his ontology. Being and nonbeing are potentials; that is, they are possibilities that live within the conceptual realm. While there is a conceptual potential of the “satanic,” what Tillich calls the complete negation of form, the ultimate triumph of nonbeing, Tillich maintains that this cannot occur. The ultimate triumph of non-being cannot occur because absolute non-being cannot exist without some intrinsic element of Being. He says: “If one is asked how nonbeing is related to being—itself, one can only answer metaphorically: being ‘embraces’ itself and nonbeing. Being has nonbeing ‘within’ itself as that which is eternally present and eternally overcome in the process of divine life.”

Nonbeing by its definition is reliant on Being for survival. Ironically, by standing in opposition to Being, nonbeing affirms the reality of Being.

To understand this seeming paradox, a clear understanding of Being must be found. A clear understanding, however, is impossible to fully articulate as the Ground of our Being lies both within and beyond; it is both immanent and transcendent. Ultimate Reality, Meaning, Ultimate Concern, God, the Unconditional—these are all terms used to refer to the Ground of our Being and provide glimpses of insight into the nature of Ultimate Reality. In the end, we do not have a complete picture, only a clearer understanding.

Perhaps a clearer understanding can be found when we view human experience through the lens of the ontological structure that Tillich provides. Frankl’s ideas resemble Tillich as Tillich tackles this existential question of human condition. Tillich envisions that what the human person experiences is separation. In other words, the human person experiences a brokenness in relationship between himself and his creator. The estrangement between God and self become a source of anxiety and, potentially, a source of despair.

The courage of being

Tillich defines the courage to be as self-affirmation in spite of the various manifestations of the threat of nonbeing. Yet the question is: how in
the depths of depression, when the apathetic response to spiritual anxiety takes hold, does one find the courage to be? Frankl responds to this pivotal question by suggesting that one must find meaning within each unique situation life brings. Thus, one maintains a hold on his or her spiritual freedom—the freedom to choose his or her response. Similarly, Tillich describes this same freedom of choice. Referring to Heidegger’s description of “resolve,” he says: “Nobody can give directions to the ‘resolute’ individual...We must be ourselves, we must decide where to go. Our conscience is the call to ourselves.” Tillich concurs with Frankl’s understanding of the depressive response to spiritual anxiety.

Neither Frankl nor Tillich end here. In Frankl’s description of the “liberated prisoner” we see clearly what Tillich calls moral anxiety of guilt and condemnation. Even after prisoners slowly piece back together their broken lives, a “survivor’s guilt” lingers and one inevitably asks: “Why me? Why was I chosen to live?” Furthermore, one asks: “Am I worthy of this life?” To be self-affirming in spite of these questions, one must accept his or her imperfections and manifestations of moral nonbeing. To use Frankl’s vocabulary, one cannot only maintain his or her spiritual freedom—the freedom to choose his or her response—one must take responsibility for these choices. In this process of embracing nonbeing, Being triumphs. Tillich concludes: “It shows that the self-affirmation of being is an affirmation that overcomes negation.” In the same vein, depression can become part of healing process for our spiritual anxiety. By acknowledging, accepting, and embracing the threat of emptiness and meaninglessness as part of our own being, the courage to be triumphs even in the worst of despair; we are able to affirm ourselves in spite of.

The courage to love

In both Frankl’s experience in the concentration camps, as well as his practice of logotherapy, he finds that meaning can be found for many in the loving relationships they participate in. Romantic love, familial love, or the experience of spiritual love between Creator and created, all provide meaning and an avenue for self-affirmation.

Frankl also suggests that a creative endeavor or scientific research could provide a goal or a purpose at which life’s movement can aim. Emily Dickenson describes this:

Each life converges to some centre

Expressed or still;
Exists in every human nature
A goal.
Admitted scornfully to itself, it may be,
Too fair
For credibility’s temerity
To dare.

Dickenson’s poem describes the simultaneous excitement and anxiety that occurs when the point of decision, the courage to be, is about to take control. This concept is perfectly in keeping with Tillich’s ontology of anxiety. The proportionate and reciprocal activity to anxiety regarding nonbeing is anxiety regarding Being.

The courage to love in light of the courage to be is the self-affirmation, the response to one’s value and purpose in life, by participating in a goal larger than oneself. Be it found within the commitment and participation in a loving and creative relationship or the dedication to a creative endeavor, one no longer focuses on the egoistic and finite self but on affirming the greater Self, a self that participates infinitely in the movement of humanity and the Ground of our Being.

Finally, the courage to love is expressed in self-love. Self-love, rooted in self-acceptance, means embracing Being and nonbeing which simultaneously and continually exists in our spiritual, ontic, and moral selves. Tillich states:

…the self-affirmation of being is an affirmation that overcomes negation. In a metaphorical statement (and every assertion about being itself is either metaphorical or symbolic) one could say that being includes nonbeing but nonbeing does not prevail against it. “Including” is a spatial metaphor which indicates that being embraces itself and that which is opposed to it, nonbeing.

Therefore, a person must love (as expressed through acceptance and affirmation) the whole self, consisting of moral and spiritual Being and nonbeing, in order for the courage to be to become an active movement of one’s life. Interestingly, many psychologists would identify a “healthy” individual by his or her ability to take responsibility for both successes and failures. In ontological terms, a “healthy” individual morally and spiritually embraces being and nonbeing within himself or herself.

Ultimately, it seems that the courage to be is found, as logotherapy suggests, by engaging in life. Logotherapy requires individuals to accept life’s challenges and invitations and find meaning within
them. In Tillichian terms, in an engaged life one finds opportunities to confront Ultimate Concern; the estranged is reunited with the Ground of our Being.

Frankl’s most profound statement can be found as he concludes his autobiographical account of his experiences in the concentration camp. He reflects that:

What was really needed was a fundamental change in our attitude toward life. We had to learn ourselves and, furthermore, we had to teach the despairing men, that it did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead think about ourselves as those who were being questioned by life—daily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not in talk and meditation, but in right action and right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual. 32

Frankl seems to suggest that each individual must find his or her own meaning within the context of his or her unique life situation. Therefore, meaning is not found external to the person; it is not an object or a final destination. Meaning is contextualized and dynamic. Thus, the courage to be, self-affirmation in spite of the threat of nonbeing, can only be described as “creative participation,” participation in an ever dynamic meaning.

Tillich’s ontology, I dare say, adds more substance to Frankl’s solid, but minimal structure. Frankl’s principle of spiritual freedom (and the implied freedom to choose) highlights and clarifies Tillich’s thought and its ramifications. By choosing to participate in a process of self-affirmation, embracing both Being and nonbeing, we find ourselves in a dynamic and relational world between the “yes” of Being and the “no” of nonbeing. In participating we recognize that we are not controlling. We find that as we, as (manifestations of Being) participate in the affirmation of Being itself and Being in turn affirms itself through us. 33 In religious terms, we receive God’s grace. Here begins a new study of the “living God.” Yet the foundation is laid, we can see clearly that meaning, Ultimate Concern, the Ground of our Being is dynamic and active. As we participate within the Ground of our Being, so does it participate within us.

A good friend shared these words with me during a time of emotional crisis. This was my experience of grace.

If everyone...just lived their lives and let others do the same, God would be in every moment, in every grain of mustard, in the fragment of cloud that is there and then gone the following moment. God was there and yet people believed they still had to go on looking, because it seemed too simple to accept that life was an act of faith.

—Paulo Coelho in Veronika Decides to Die

The experience of grace

When the discipline of psychology operates in a humanistic, not just technical, perspective, it aligns closely with Tillich’s ontological understanding of finding meaning through the courage to be. Humanism emphasizes the importance of self-actualization. While self-actualization has a connotation of a state-like experience, it would be more accurate to describe it as an intrinsic human process or movement towards growth. 34 This mirrors Tillich’s understanding that Being is dynamic and active. All beings are in movement aimed at communion with that which is experienced as estranged, the Ground of our Being. Another word for this is love. 35 Likewise, humanistic psychology also highlights the importance of the client-therapist relationship in psychotherapy. This also mirrors the belief asserted by both Frankl and Tillich that Meaning or Ultimate Concern can be encountered through participation in human relationships, perhaps the most interesting parallel can be drawn between the humanistic “peak” experience and the religious experience of grace.

Thomas Plante describes “peak experiences” as “the moments in life when self-actualization is reached.” 36 An emphasis here should be placed on “moments,” as peak experiences are dynamic, not static. While one can reach self-actualization (which would imply a state-like quality of self-actualization), dynamism can still be preserved. Through these moments of peak experience, the parameters of time and space are extinguished; traditional understanding of language becomes less than adequate. 37 In light of the depressed individual, I would describe these peak moments as experiences of healing light in the darkness of the mind. At least for a moment, spiritual anxiety (which is clouding the depressed person’s perceptions) is alleviated. In
religious terms, peak experiences could be described as moments when God reveals Godself to the person through grace. Peak experiences reveal the transformative power of Being itself. Peak experiences allow a “fundamental change in attitude” to be realized and accepted.

A therapist often seeks to help a client develop “new eyes.” Likewise, most religious movements tend to emphasize providing a new understanding of reality, a new conceptual world view. Yet as most organized religions clearly acknowledge, “the fundamental change in attitude” does not come from appeals to the intellect. It comes from an experience that touches the heart or the soul or the psyche. The Gospel writers of the Judeo-Christian perspective call this “fundamental change in attitude” metanoia, a repentance or a change of heart, when they urge individuals towards repentance and baptism. Mark describes Jesus’ entrance into the Galilean ministry, after John has been arrested, when he says: “This is the time of fulfillment. The kingdom of God is at hand. Repent, and believe in the gospel.” A “fundamental change in attitude” comes from an experience of simultaneous immanence and transcendence (i.e. “the kingdom of God is at hand”); this is an experience of grace. Through grace, the Ground of our Being enters into our tightly controlled, egoistic and finite human lives and surprises us, comforts us, and jolts us into seeing life with new eyes.

Depression can be understood as an extreme response to existential spiritual anxiety. Depression can also be understood as an opportunity for healing. This ontological examination of depression reveals that existential spiritual anxiety is an experience common to all human persons. It reflects the brokenness and emptiness of the human person and the common search for healing. It reflects an estrangement of the human person to the Ground of our Being. I suggest that, while depression may be a pathological response to anxiety, it may also be a fundamental and important step in the healing process of the person. Depression necessitates a confrontation with the source of anxiety, non-being. By confronting non-being, one finds that any assertion of non-being will reciprocally allow Being to assert itself. No longer estranged, human brokenness begins to heal.

**Bibliography**


4 Ibid., 204.

5 Ibid., 192.

6 Ibid., 134.

9 Sykes, 22.


14 Interestingly, in terms of psychotherapy, “fear of” or phobia (which requires an object) is a disorder with a specific cognitive-behavioral therapeutic approach (exposure/guided mastery) which has a statistically high rate of effectiveness and a relatively short period of treatment. It seems, especially when compared to other anxiety disorders, that when the object of anxiety is concrete and finite it easier for the human person to learn to cope. On the other hand, when the anxiety is abstract and infinite, as in the case of generalized anxiety disorder, the length and effectiveness of therapy is quite limited. This comparison brings insight to the ontology of a person.

15 Tillich, The Courage To Be, 37.


19 Ibid., 114.

20 Ibid., 113-114.

21 Ibid., 27.

22 Ibid., 31.

24 Ibid., 159.

25 Ibid., 159.

26 Ibid., 54-55.

27 Ibid., 32.

28 Ibid., 34.

29 Tillich, The Courage To Be, 148.

30 Ibid., 179.

31 Ibid., 179.

32 Frankl, 122.

33 Tillich, The Courage to Be, 169.

34 Self-actualization can be compared with the Buddhist term nirvana. Nirvana is often understood to be an ultimate state; however, this misconception does not fully express the dynamic and simultaneously immanent and transcendent nature of the Buddhist experience of enlightenment.


36 Thomas Plante, Contemporary Clinical Psychology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999), 64.

37 An argument can be made that the inadequacy of human language to describe a peak experience. One could suggest that this inadequacy makes peak moments inaccessible to the conversational context required for psychotherapy and, thus, prevents psychotherapy from delving into religious or spiritual issues.

38 Mark 1:14-15.

39 Tillich, The Courage to Be, 190.
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